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This article is my first attempt to state a general theory of human 
progress in connection with the concept of population numbers and 
human capital. The theory is presented with only a sketchy formal 
framework and with little supporting data; those elements must await a 
longer presentation.
The question addressed here is: What is the rock bottom cause of so 
many of the world's population now being long-lived and endowed 
with much wealth and a high standard of living, with an even larger 
proportion likely to enjoy these benefits in the coming decades, 
whereas people did not have those advantages 10,000, 2,000, 1,000, or 
even 200 years ago? The obvious answer almost a definition is that 
current technology A 1993 is a sum of increments to knowledge dA in 
the past. And these dA were produced by people and therefore must 
have been influenced by human numbers. One may add that the cul 
tural, political, economic, and social systems of the past were also a 
factor, and perhaps a more important factor than numbers. I shall 
argue, however, that those systems were themselves a function of 
human numbers together with the economic levels of past societies; 
this is one of the main points of the paper.
Why did the rapid progress of the past two centuries not begin cen 
turies or millennia earlier, or not begin until sometime in the future? 
Was there something extraordinary about the human numbers P or the 
level of technology A in the year 1700 or so? Probably not. But we 
must notice one crucial correlation: Both P and A as well as the income 
Y all began to rise rapidly about that time. That rise represented an 
unprecedented tripling or more within a century or two and was the 
first such event in all the thousands of years of human history.
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The answer I offer is that the size of the human population, as mea 
sured by both population density P/lnd and P together with the tech 
nology these people produced, is the root cause of the speed of 
progress. More operationally, if the world's population had not grown 
at all since, say, 10,000 years ago, or if population had not grown as 
fast as it did over the millennia, the material condition of humanity 
could not have progressed to its present state. To put it differently, if 
the rate of population growth had been different (and had resulted in 
different total populations at various times) than actually was the case, 
the extraordinary period of the past two hundred years of falling mor 
tality and increasing income would have happened either much later or 
much earlier. Furthermore, one cannot say this of any other variable 
unless it would primarily alter human numbers as, for example, a cli 
matic change would have affected food production, or the quantity of 
energy easily available would have improved survival probabilities. If 
there were not an effect on human numbers, such a change would have 
affected the amount of leisure and perhaps the mode of getting a living, 
for example, herding versus hunting, but would not have affected the 
speed of economic progress.
Even bestowing a library of today's knowledge upon a small popu 
lation in the past probably would not have led to rapid progress. 
Indeed, we know from the experience of India and China and other 
poor countries until recently that the existence of such knowledge can 
coexist with continuing backwardness. This leads to the question of 
whether that fact does not contradict the basic thesis of this paper. I 
think it does not, because we already see the inexorable process of 
rapid modernization in these countries, despite having economic-polit 
ical-social systems not well designed for such progress, systems that 
kept the modernization from happening earlier (as it happened earlier 
in Japan). And in turn, the combination of numbers and the existence 
of knowledge, together with the demand for the fruits that knowledge 
brings about, are inducing huge changes in the economic systems so as 
to accommodate more rapid progress, as the thesis in this paper sug 
gests; this has been the case most vividly for 700 million rural Chinese 
whose agriculture was essentially privatized starting in 1979. So, taken 
altogether the evidence available as of 1993 concerning the poor 
though well-populated countries is not inconsistent with the thesis 
offered here.
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Two lines of evidence are adduced to support the basic proposition: 
(1) correlations of population size P and density P/\nd with the rate of 
knowledge production dA, and (2) evidence that other relevant vari 
ables are a function of P and Y. I also present some scrappy evidence to 
show that population is not only correlated with knowledge production 
but also is a causal variable. And I present theory and data to disprove 
the proposition that the "natural" availability of natural resources has 
been a crucial force.
I will argue (in connection with the causal concept used here) that 
there is no nonbiological variable "deeper" than human numbers that 
one can point to as being responsible for the population growth that 
occurred, as one can point to population growth as being responsible 
for the growth in income and the evolution of institutions and patterns 
of behavior that were necessary for the progress that occurred. That is, 
I will argue that unlike all other nonbiological variables, population 
growth is exogenous in the process.
Many laypersons would say (and I agree with them) that the propo 
sition stated here is entirely obvious: If there were no people, there 
would be no "human capital" to create the knowledge that leads to 
progress, and hence there would be no progress. But this answer is not 
at all obvious or agreed-to in the view of many scholars, when speak 
ing of long-run as well as of short-run progress. So the work required 
here is not the demolition of a strawman.
It is a crucial element of the model stated here that population 
growth and density affect the structure of law and tradition and politi 
cal institutions. If this were not so, structures that are incompatible 
with an improvement in technology and the long-run standard of living 
could have remained in place indefinitely, thereby preventing further 
progress. It is therefore an important part of this essay and perhaps 
its most important novelty to offer fine-structure evidence for this 
process of population-induced social change.
The complex web of relationships of endemic and epidemic disease, 
and knowledge of them, with population density and total numbers 
also is an important part of the analysis.
The strategy of the article will be as follows. The next section pre 
sents the theory offered here. I then review the skimpy time-series and 
cross-sectional evidence on the relationship of population to the rate of 
economic growth in the long run, and ask about the possibility that
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other variables could explain the observed long-run economic growth; 
at best, these data make aprimafacie but not a compelling case for the 
theory. Next I digress to explore one particular topic which has been at 
the root of thinking about population economics for three thousand 
years: the relationship of numbers of people to supplies of natural 
resources. I follow that with a presentation of evidence on the relation 
ship of population to structural factors that affect the rate of economic 
progress; this section is the heart of the paper; if given the space that 
the subject deserves, the section would take up most of the book which 
this subject properly requires (and which may yet come forth if luck 
holds).
Various sections draw heavily upon my earlier work on the subject 
of population growth; this article may be thought of as part of an evo 
lutionary process in knowledge development.
A Stylized Description of Human Progress
In order to set the scene before launching into more formal work, 
here is a stylized description of the long-run history of the process of 
human progress. The first hominids came into being without any body 
of knowledge that they themselves created, but instinctive knowledge 
of how to survive was programmed into their genes just as with every 
other species. And the early people may have learned some additional 
techniques by observing other animals that happened to live within 
their ken, such as techniques of building shelters and gathering food. 
Such imitations may have been the first sort of learning that is distinc 
tively human in its cumulative adaptation to the world about us. (I have 
recently read that there seems to be a similar process of imitation 
among apes, but it is questionable whether the knowledge can be 
handed down from one generation to the next.)
The hominids then increased their population, just as other new spe 
cies (if successful) increase their populations by spreading across new 
territory into niches that will sustain them. At some point whether 
population had stabilized by that time or not is unknown new discov 
eries were made. These discoveries might have included the knowl 
edge of fire and of stone implements the latter occurring at least two
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million years ago, according to Leakey (1981, p. 78). Each discovery 
improved the ability of our ancestors to survive and allowed numbers 
to increase faster than before the discovery; even simple stone tools 
must have had a large effect on the rate of population growth. (Fire and 
stone tools are "invention-pull" rather than "population-push" technol 
ogy, requiring no increase in labor and therefore being of immediate 
utility rather than waiting for further population growth to make them 
profitable.) But recent work with genetics suggests that about 65,000 
years ago the population was only about 100,000 and declined to about 
10,000 before expanding again ("Research News," Science, October 1, 
1993).
Why did rapid economic progress not occur much earlier say 
100,000 or a million years ago? Was it just an accident that rapid 
progress ever began, and could that accident just as easily have taken 
place many millennia earlier? I think not; I cannot imagine any single 
event that could have come along and made a big difference at an ear 
lier time. The early invention of nuclear power obviously is inconceiv 
able, but even had a nuclear reactor and full instructions been dropped 
on earth by Martians, it would have been less use than a meteorite. Uti 
lization of nuclear power had to wait for the accumulation of the nexus 
of human numbers and knowledge.
Only a biological or environmental difference that would have 
altered the nutrition and/or the rate of fertility and of subsequent sur 
vival either climate or the appearance of a remarkable new easy-to- 
obtain food source (or the opposite) or a change in the digestive sys 
tem, for example could have altered the speed of economic progress 
through the millennia. If numbers had been greater earlier on, there 
would have been more people to invent and develop new discoveries 
such as new ways of herding and cropping. Larger numbers also would 
have meant greater need for such improvements earlier on, which 
would have speeded up their adoption after invention in those cases 
where adoption is not immediately profitable (Boserupian population- 
push inventions).
Other kinds of differences could not have changed the rate of 
progress, I contend. The earliest hominids had elements of a social sys 
tem in their genetic programs, just as do apes; for example, incest was 
surely practiced only infrequently, as with other species of animals. 
But while there must have been some variations in social system from
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one band of hominids to another, it would not have been possible for 
them to live with a modern form of social system that is consistent with 
modern rates of rapid progress, such as democracy, over an area as 
large as hundreds or even tens of miles in each direction, even if some 
one had invented it; such modern systems could not be used until pop 
ulation and technology (and the standard of living) had increased many 
times over.
Would history have been very different if numbers had stayed at the 
level they were at the time of Athens' glory? I contend that we would 
not have reached the technology and the standard of living we now 
enjoy especially our unprecedented life expectancy, which began to 
lengthen rapidly only 250 years ago if our numbers had remained at 
the few hundreds of millions on earth at the peak of Rome and Greece.
This essay is an attempt to support with theory and data the thoughts 
sketched out in the above paragraphs.
The Theoretical Framework
My thesis is that (1) higher density and (2) larger total populations, 
in individual societies and on earth altogether, were necessary condi 
tions for progress. The extent to which they were (and are) also suffi 
cient conditions depended in the past upon the nature of the societies at 
the time. Particular societies certainly have been capable of retrogres 
sion in the face of population growth. The analysis suggests, though it 
cannot constitute more than a speculation on the matter, that conditions 
of twentieth century transportation and communications have rendered 
such long-term retrogression less and less likely, however.
The appropriate form for the inquiry is to ask: What would be the 
effect of a major change in some variable jc? For example, what effect 
would there have been if the Anglo-Saxon legal system had somehow 
been transmitted to North American natives in the year 1000? Would 
this have had a major effect on their economic and demographic 
growth? The theory points to variables that are the key conditions of 
readiness for growth the nexus of population numbers together with 
the stock of knowledge and the level of the standard of living.
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An alternative theory, which I believe to be less compelling than the 
theory stated above, is that the invention of new knowledge by itself 
would raise the standard of living. For example, if starting in, say, the 
year 1000 societies had somehow decided to educate a much larger 
number of people and then put them to work in knowledge-producing 
pursuits, would that have raised the rate of progress of the living stan 
dard? Surely there would have been some increase in progress, but 
how much? The work of Boserup (1965), together with my analysis of 
inventions into those that are and are not immediately adopted without 
appropriate demand conditions (Simon 1977, chapter 8; 1978; and 
1992, chapter 3), shows that some newly invented knowledge can 
remain dormant for a long time if demographic conditions are not 
appropriate for its adoption at the time.
A secondary and related thesis is that the income level of a society is 
the other most important determinant of significant material and tech 
nical variables such as health, knowledge, physical and social mobility, 
and communications. I will not develop this thesis here.
Conceptual Frameworks and the Time Horizon
The appropriate conceptual framework for the analysis of the effects 
of population depends upon the length of horizon and upon the level of 
economic development (which has the aggregate in the long-run corre 
late with the historical date). These are some of the relevant frame 
works.
1. For the very short run in a subsistence society, the framework of 
Malthus is appropriate; the coming of more mouths or a deterioration 
of natural conditions leads to diminishing returns in agriculture and 
causes there to be less to eat for the average person. For the very short 
run in a developed economy, the appropriate framework is a system of 
equations which may have hundreds of variables and thousands of con 
nections, as seen in the spaghetti-like large-scale multisector models 
used for forecasting by consultants to government and business. In 
these short-run models for both subsistence and developed economies, 
the stock of technology and the nature of institutions and sometimes 
even the size of the labor force are considered fixed.
2. Somewhat longer-term models consider physical and human cap 
ital to vary. The growth of technology usually is considered to occur at
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a constant rate. The structures of political institutions, law, work 
behavior, and tradition are considered to be fixed. The income level 
and the size of the labor force are important variables in such models.
3. An even longer-run model of a subsistence society allows for the 
nonconstant endogenous introduction of new technology. The alterna 
tive frameworks of the long-run Malthusian dynamics (quite different 
from the short-run Malthusian model mentioned above) and of the 
Boserup analysis for subsistence agriculture are complementary rather 
than opposing, as we shall see below. For developed economies, the 
recent crop of endogenous-growth models (including my own work on 
endogenous knowledge in connection with population growth) make 
technology endogenous, but do not include some of the variables 
included in the shorter-run models. These endogenous-growth models 
include only income, population, and knowledge as independent vari 
ables, and consider the structures of law and tradition only peripher 
ally, if at all. Population growth may or may not be endogenous in this 
sort of model.
4. The longest-run model, the heart of this paper, contains popula 
tion growth at the earliest date in the dynamic system as the sole exog 
enous variable; the structures of law, tradition, and other institutions 
are endogenous variables, along with the standard of living, technol 
ogy, and subsequent population growth. From such a model one can 
deduce the proposition that if biological or climatological elements had 
caused the rate of population growth to be faster than it actually was, 
humanity would have had greater numbers than actually existed at var 
ious times in the past; and each state in its development, including the 
present state of high material culture and low mortality, would there 
fore have reached centuries or millennia earlier.
Population and Knowledge
The most difficult analytic issue concerns the relationship between 
the causal roles of population and of knowledge. They are the only two 
variables about which one can reasonably say: If the stock of this vari 
able had been much lower than its actual stock in year t, the state of 
humanity would have been vastly poorer in the year t + x than it actu 
ally was. All other variables, such as the stocks of private physical cap-
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ital and prime farmland, are likely to be replaced rather quickly if there 
is a sudden catastrophic loss; not so with population and knowledge.
The rock bottom causal element of long-run human progress is the 
combination of population and knowledge. They are as much insepara 
ble parts of the same process as are the brain and the sexual organs. It 
makes as little sense to ask which is the "original" cause as about 
chicken and egg. Even the earliest humankind could not have survived 
and grown without such technology as cutting tools and fire; and in 
turn, the knowledge of these techniques came from human beings.
Indeed, the interpenetration of population and technology is shown 
by the fact that history consists of both the Boserupian "population- 
push" and the Malthusian "invention-pull" combinations of an inven 
tion and population growth, in which causation runs from one of these 
two forces in one case and to it in the other. (In Simon 1977, chapter 8; 
1978; and 1992, chapter 3, I provide geometric and arithmetic theory 
for these two processes, together with extensive historical examples.)
The key point is that no other element was as essential as the combi 
nation of knowledge and human numbers not institutions, law, physi 
cal capital, natural resources, or any other element. Humankind could 
live in a variety of settings of these variables and produce livable forms 
of them when they are completely absent; not so with knowledge and 
human numbers.
Evidence on the Long-Run Progress-Population Connection
This section reviews the available time-series and cross-sectional 
evidence on the relationship of population to the rate of economic 
growth in the long run. The purpose is to show that there is indeed a 
connection to be investigated; these data make a prima facie case for 
the theory, but it is only prima facie and not a compelling case; to 
make a persuasive case requires the later sections of the paper. Then 
there is discussion of the possibility that variables other than popula 
tion could explain the observed long-run economic growth.
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Population Size and the Standard of Living
Time-series evidence.
The first set of time-series evidence is stylized figures of crucial 
variables over the very long run. The purpose of the graphs is to show 
how all these variables moved in much the same general way, with 
population moving earlier than the others. The lack of any precise data 
and the consequent absence of ups and downs in the series prevents 
any explicit statistical exploration of causality.
For the longest period of the existence of human beings as a spe 
cies from, say, 20,000 years ago until 6,000 or 7,000 years ago  
population growth was very slow, and hence total population and pop 
ulation density were low. This growth might be described by a straight 
line if plotted on semilog paper, but such a plot would obscure the 
point of the graph, which is that the rate of early growth was infinitesi 
mal.
A slightly less broad view is shown in figure 1, whose logarithmic 
scale reveals the rapid increases in population starting with the onset of 
the agricultural, industrial, and postindustrial "revolutions."





















997 500 97 500
002% if/0005% 02% 1/005%
Surge 2  ~
resulting from the
BC AD AD AD AD 
7500 0 1500 2000 240
2% 1/05% 2% 
V \fc
Surge 3 -^^_^_^ J
resulting from the ^^~~~^jf
industrial revolution <r
and not yet limited f-+r
invention of agriculture /
and irrigation
*^^
.f ^ Surge 1
/ resulting from the 
' development of tools,
clothing and fire
NOW (1981)   >
S^
1 million 100,000 10,000 
Years Before 2500 AD
1,000 100
SOURCE: After Deevey 1960, by Tinsley 1980, p. 11 
NOTE: Please notice that the axes are logarithmic.
The Very-Long-Run Effect of Human Capital on Human Progress 139
During most of the past millennia, economic progress undoubtedly 
was slow or nonexistent (which is proven by jobbing backwards; 
spreading total growth over such a long period of time implies a very 
low average rate), though it is very difficult to find meaningful indica 
tors. Perhaps the most meaningful measure of economic progress 
through the ages, both because of its intrinsic importance and because 
we have some reliable data, is life expectancy; it increased only slowly 
from the minimum level at which the species could be sustained rather 
than go extinct. The most striking aspect of the increase in life expect 
ancy for world populations at various dates over the past 10,000 years 
is the rapid recent increase in the richer countries since the eighteenth 
century, and in the poorer countries in the second half of the twentieth 
country; this is an absolutely unprecedented event, and the most 
important development in the history of humankind from the stand 
point of economics as well as noneconomic welfare.
Some evidence that one might consider as disconfirming the basic 
proposition of this paper is found in the long-run early history. The 
total number of human beings who ever lived before, say, 6000 years 
ago was not small; a reasonable estimate is that of the 77 billion human 
beings born from 600,000 BC to 1962 AD, 12 billion lived before 6000 
BC (with 42 billion from 6000 BC to 1650 AD, and 23 billion from 1650 
AD to 1962 AD), to be compared with the more than 5 billion who may 
be alive now. 1 Of course many of the people born in earlier years died 
at young ages. But even so, the number of years of human life lived on 
earth in the long-ago past was not small relative to any recent period. 
Are these numbers inconsistent with their total intellectual production 
in light of the thesis of this paper? Later I shall argue that because the 
production of knowledge depends upon the existing stock of knowl 
edge as well as the population size and density, the slow growth of 
knowledge in early millennia does not confute the basic thesis.
The tool-using and tool-making revolution kicked off the rapid rise 
in population around 1,000,000 BC The aid of various implements gave 
the food gatherer and hunter access to the widest range of environ 
ments. But when the productivity gains from the use of primitive tools 
had been largely exploited, the rate of population growth fell.
The next rapid jump in population started perhaps 10,000 years ago, 
when people began to keep herds and cultivate the earth rather than 
simply foraging for wild plants and game. Once again the rate of popu-
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lation growth abated after the initial productivity gains from the new 
technology had been exploited, and population size settled down to a 
near-plateau compared to the rapid growth experienced for a while. 
The known methods of making a living constituted a constraint to fur 
ther population growth once the world's population reached a certain 
size.
These two previous episodes of sharp rise and subsequent fall in the 
rate of population growth suggest that the present rapid growth  
which began perhaps 300 or 350 years ago, in the 1600s may settle 
down again when, or if, the gains from the new industrial and agricul 
tural knowledge that followed the "industrial revolution" begin to peter 
out. And population size may again reach a near-plateau and remain 
there until another "revolution" due to another major change in tech 
nology, society, or psychology. Of course the current knowledge revo 
lution may continue without foreseeable end, and population growth 
may or may not continue as long as the revolution does. Either way, in 
this long-term view population size adjusts to productive conditions 
rather than being an uncontrolled monster.
To return to the many humans who lived in early millennia but pro 
duced little new knowledge: If progress were a function of the number 
of human minds alone, the total medical progress during the long 
period before, say, 6000 BCE should have been as great as in the last 50 
years, during which life expectancy increased rapidly and hugely. But 
it was not so. Nor was the absence of rapid population growth as a 
stimulus a reasonable explanation; the presence of sickness and the 
danger of death certainly have been in all times a sufficiently powerful 
motivation for major efforts at innovation. So this immediately 
requires that a theory be more complex than the total number of per 
sons alive among whom the spark of invention and progress might 
somehow arise spontaneously.
The most reasonable additional explanatory variables are these: (1) 
Population density conduces to the production and transmission of new 
ideas, according to the theory of Simon Kuznets and the study by 
Kelley (1972) of Higgs's (1971) data on American inventiveness. (2) 
Production of new knowledge is influenced by the stock of existing 
knowledge; the more existing ideas that may be built upon, the greater 
the propensity to create new ideas. (This is demonstrated for the case
The Very-Long-Run Effect of Human Capital on Human Progress 141
of patents in England over many centuries by Simon and Sullivan 
1989.)
Evidence from the modern period demonstrating that economic 
growth in the developed countries has been faster in more recent 
decades than in more distant decades when population was smaller is 
found in the work of Maddison, Fellner, and Meguire (the latter finding 
that the U.S. data do not square with the other countries' data, though it 
is logically necessary that growth now be faster than, say, 200 years 
ago (see Simon, forthcoming, for a review of this evidence).
Cross-sectional evidence.
Cross-national comparison of the data for recent decades reveals 
that higher population density is correlated with a higher rate of eco 
nomic growth (Simon and Gobin 1980).
Population Growth and the Growth of Technology
The next evidence to be presented concerns the bivariate relation 
ships between population and such other variables as knowledge and 
productivity over the period for which at least some data exists to 
check for causality.
A long-run measure of the stock of the most important kind of 
knowledge agricultural technology is the number of persons that a 
single agricultural worker can feed. The complementary variable is the 
proportion of the labor force that works in agriculture; it was nearly the 
entire labor force throughout human history. But in about 1600 the pro 
portion began to fall in the richest countries, and it now has reached 
less than 2 percent in some affluent countries; the decline has unmis 
takably begun in the poor parts of the world, too. This also is the best 
long-term measure of the standard of living and of productivity.
A closely related measure of agricultural technology as indicated by 
agricultural productivity per person is the price in labor time of a given 
quantity of food. This price has fallen in the U.S. since 1800 by a factor 
of perhaps 20 (Simon 1992).
A measure of technology related to productivity per person is pro 
ductivity per unit of land the amount of land employed to feed an 
average person. The quantity of land needed to feed a person has 
declined extraordinarily over the years, in best practice by an astonish-
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ing factor of perhaps 25 million, compared with hunting and fishing 
and by almost as much in standard practice, indicating an extraordinary 
increase in productivity.
Shifting now to technology in metals production: Analogous to the 
decline in the price of food as measured by the amount of time required 
to produce it is the decline in the prices of metals an enormous fall 
with respect to the price of labor in rich countries and large even com 
pared with the consumer price index over the past two centuries 
(Simon 1981; forthcoming), continuing a trend observable for 4,000 
years. The supply of copper may be viewed in this context as a final 
good and a component measure of the standard of living; it may also be 
seen later as an element in the progress of productivity. The line of cau 
sation from population to price seems rather clear here; there is no 
other reasonable explanation of the increase in supply except an 
increase in demand and in the supply of minds to produce new ways to 
increase the supply and invent new substitutes.
The speed and cost of transportation is another good whose technol 
ogy has measurably improved. (Transport is a good in itself, as well as 
affecting the supply of food.) In just the past two centuries, speed has 
risen from the 3-mile-an-hour walking pace of a human or the some 
what faster pace of a horse or ship to hundreds of miles per hour on 
land and thousands of miles per hour in the air (not even counting 
space travel).
Long-run data on the increase in the stock of knowledge as mea 
sured by the number of scientific journals and patents in the past five 
centuries, and in human capital as measured by numbers of literate per 
sons and persons with given amounts of education (the absolute num 
bers are more relevant than the proportions, though the proportion is 
also of interest), are sufficiently well known as to not need further dis 
cussion here.
Some writers have suggested Greece and Rome as counterexamples. 
But their rates of discoveries of important new ideas were faster in 
their peak periods of population than before or after those periods (see 
Simon 1981).
Another long period whose data are relevant is the Dark Ages. Cur 
rently most commentators, such as Pirenne, agree that after population 
declined, the standard of living fell and progress ceased despite the 
increase in agricultural land per agriculturalist and the consequent drop
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in the price of land; this might have been caused by the decline in total 
population or the lack of growth or both. Much the same seems to have 
been true in the years after the Black Death. In contrast, the rapid 
increases in population starting around 1000 and 1500 were accompa 
nied by buoyant economic progress.
Simon and Sullivan (1989) show that in England from 1500 to 1800 
population and knowledge (as measured by patents) do not just grow 
together secularly, but there is a causal relationship between them 
when other variables are held constant.
Cross-sectional evidence.
A work tradition beginning with Rostas (1948) shows that when 
pairs of countries are compared, growth in productivity is higher in 
those industries in which production is relatively larger; in light of the 
association between higher production and higher population ceteris 
paribus, this suggests that higher population leads to higher increases 
in productivity.
Another relevant cross-sectional study is that of Glover and Simon 
(1975), which shows that road density is greater where population is 
more dense. And roads are a crucial element in the transmission of 
knowledge.
Natural Resources and Population
As North (1981) has written, natural resources have been a major 
element in discussions of population growth since the first such 
recorded discussions. The constraint of natural resources must there 
fore be considered before one can appreciate a theory of human 
progress in the past despite the perceived limits of natural resources  
progress that is without known bounds in the future as natural resource 
constraints lessen rather than tighten.
Astonishingly, the importance of land and other natural resources 
diminishes with every passing decade. Such was the great discovery of 
Schultz about land in 1951, and of Barnett and Morse (1963) about 
agricultural and mined resources. Their forecasts based on the histori 
cal record and theoretical analyses have been borne out perfectly by
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events since then, as food and all metals, indeed, all natural resources, 
have continued to get cheaper rather than more expensive.
Natural resources are the most dramatic examples of the fundamen 
tal process at work in the long course of economic progress: Increasing 
population or rising income raises demand for a commodity, which 
usually implies a higher price. The higher price represents opportu 
nity for businesses to make a profit and for inventors and institutions 
to realize their desires to make creative social contributions. Most pro 
spective discoverers fail to find solutions to the problem, and they pay 
the price themselves. One or more succeed in finding the needed solu 
tions. And usually the outcome, most unexpected though very impor 
tant, is that the solution leaves humanity better off than before the 
problem arose. That is, we end up with cheaper resources than before 
the problem of the rise in price first occurred.
The story of this process at work in the case of energy since about 
the fifteenth century in England from wood to coal to oil to nuclear 
power is told at length in my 1981 book, as is the story of copper 
during the 4000 years since Hammurabi.
A formal model of this process using the example of farmland may 
be found in Simon and Steinman (1991) or in Simon (1992, chapter 5). 
We simulate the model with meaningful parameters and analyze how 
the course of food prices and land availability will change over centu 
ries. We also analyze the steady-state properties of the system to show 
how it is consistent with long-run growth in the standard of living as 
human numbers increase.
Very-Long-Run Processes
It should help substantiate the exogeneity of growth to provide evi 
dence on the disaggregated sinews of the process; this is the task of the 
present section. This section contains the new substantive material 
conveyed by this article, material which provides the evidence for the 
propositions that (1) the rate of progress is a function of human num 
bers; and (2) in the very long run all social and economic dimensions 
are indeed a function of population size and density and constitute
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endogenous intermediate variables rather than independent causal vari 
ables.
The elements that this section will touch on include the develop 
ment of markets, social and economic organization, law, disease, and 
evolved cultural patterns. Here our time horizon is so long that the phe 
nomena that change over such a long period usually are not even men 
tioned in the context of population economics. These phenomena have 
been studied little, and because the ground is new the amount of data is 
small. Hopefully the paucity of data will not mislead the reader about 
the importance of these phenomena.
The Development of Markets
The size of the market depends upon both the number of people and 
the level of income. The number of persons multiplied by their average 
level of income measures aggregate income, and is perhaps the basic 
measure of the size of the market. (Of course the sizes of submarkets 
will be affected by the distribution of the total income among persons, 
but that can be left aside here.) There is a presumption, then, that more 
people imply bigger markets.
Increased population density also leads to better-organized markets. 
Hicks (1969) and North (1981) have shown the connection between 
these variables throughout history at the local and regional level. As 
noted earlier, this phenomenon was seen vividly after the depopulation 
of the Black Death. Despite higher wages and increased land availabil 
ity to cultivators, overall economic conditions apparently were less 
favorable. There was general economic depression as a result of the 
disappearance of markets that in turn was caused by lack of people and 
products to support markets.
A look at mircoeconomic theory with population and market growth 
in mind immediately suggests many avenues through which there is 
improved competition when population is larger rather than smaller, 
especially the effects of having more rather than fewer producers and 
sellers. In general, a larger number of competitors leads to a more 
responsive and more rapidly changing marketplace.
Cities, along with infrastructure, seem to have been a crucial pre 
condition of the industrial revolution in England, Holland, and else 
where. The existence of cities requires relatively dense populations in
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surrounding areas. Cities and markets are closely related phenomena. 
Pirenne's magisterial analysis (1925/1969) depends heavily on popula 
tion growth and size. Larger absolute numbers of people are the basis 
for increased trade and consequent growth in cities, which in turn 
strongly influenced the creation of an exchange economy in place of 
the subsistence economy of the manor.
According to Pirenne, growth in population causing cities to grow 
also reduced serfdom by offering serfs legal haven in the city, as 
memorialized in the saying "Town air makes free."
Disease
The evolution of the disease environment is another of the crucial 
evolutionary processes that population density and growth have influ 
enced. Density of population affects the virulence of disease; some 
times it makes disease spread faster, as in the case of epidemics, and 
sometimes it suppresses it, as in the case of malaria. And there are fur 
ther complications: Sometimes increased virulence leads later to 
immunities that check the spread of diseases. McNeill (1977) describes 
how the evolution of the disease environment has been greatly influ 
enced in complex ways by population density and therefore by popula 
tion growth.
For most of the great diseases, the growth of population in earlier 
centuries represented a one-time "investment" of our species into 
developing resistance to mass killers; once our ancestors had suffered 
this experience, later generations could go about their lives with less 
threats.
A different sequence: By causing the land to be cropped closely, 
increasing population density reduces the virulence of malaria, the 
greatest killer of all; an important example was South China, which 
was only colonized after this process had made it habitable.
A body of knowledge about the prevention and cure of diseases also 
has evolved, much of it in a prescientific trial-and-error process; an 
older example is the practice of quarantine. More recently, health 
knowledge has begun to evolve from systematic scientific work; an 
example is smallpox vaccination. Such advances in medical practice 
can be attributed to the combination of a scientific attitude and a 
greater base of scientific medical knowledge, both of which were
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enhanced by the industrial revolution; these advances occurred in 
countries that were experiencing the industrial revolution, and did not 
occur in countries such as India and China that were outside the ambit 
of the industrial revolution. This greater capacity to deal actively with 
the disease environment may be seen as a consequence of population 
growth.
Events during the industrial revolution are instructive in this regard. 
The causes of the fall in the death rate are also somewhat unclear, 
though in recent years scholars have made rapid progress in under 
standing the phenomenon. Some part of the mortality drop may have 
been unconnected with economic progress; the climate may have 
improved and yielded better crops, the rat population may have sponta 
neously altered its species composition in such fashion that the rigors 
of plague diminished, and the disease environment may otherwise have 
become less dangerous. Some part of the improvement may stem from 
economic progress in only very indirect fashion, if at all, notably 
through shorter periods of breastfeeding and hence less inhibition of 
pregnancy. But economic progress was surely responsible for most of 
the improved life expectancy.
Economic progress, which interactively is the result of population 
growth, helped people live longer by providing better diets. McKeown 
(McKeown and Brown 1955; McKeown 1985) has argued forcefully 
that "the slow growth of the human population before the eighteenth 
century was due mainly to lack of food, and the rapid increase from 
that time resulted largely from improved nutrition" (1985, p. 29). 
Fogel's (1989) work agrees. (The importance of nutrition is surpris 
ingly difficult to establish conclusively, however.)
Economic progress also helped people live longer through develop 
ment of the physical infrastructure of society, especially provision of 
purer communal drinking water. Such improvements were not mainly 
intended to improve health and reduce death, but they nevertheless did 
so to an important degree. Building such infrastructure requires farm 
ing to be sufficiently efficient so that society can afford to employ peo 
ple on such community projects. Also required is that the population be 
sufficiently large and dense that such projects are economical. The 
same is true for roads and other communication systems that contrib 
uted to the spread of health technology. (See earlier discussion of road 
density and population density.)
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In some places greater population density must have had short-term 
negative effects upon health by temporarily lowering the standard of 
living the Malthusian "positive check." But in the longer run, the 
overall result of population growth on the incidence of disease clearly 
has been positive.
Social and Political Organization
Though it is difficult to pin down statistically, the effect of popula 
tion size and density upon social and political organization and its role 
in economic development is given ever greater importance by such 
scholars as Jones (1981) and McNeill (1963).
Population density and size seem to be related to the mode of orga 
nization and the size of the government sector. Stevenson (1968) 
argues that increasing density leads to better-articulated organization 
of society; this seems plausible, but the phenomenon is difficult to 
quantify.
The relationship of population growth to the abolition of feudalism 
and slavery is controversial and needs further investigation.
It is enlightening to keep in mind a question that is frequently asked: 
If more people cause there to be more ideas and knowledge, more 
growth of markets and cities, and hence higher productivity and 
income, why did not the modernization revolution begin in India and 
China? This requires more lengthy discussion than this introduction to 
the subject permits; suffice it to say that it ties into discussion of what 
Jones calls "the European miracle."
In Europe there seems to have been a nexus of interconnections 
between loosening of feudal ties, growth of cities, personal economic 
freedom, political freedom, openness of societies, competition among 
European states, economic advance, popular government, and popula 
tion growth. McNeill (1963), Jones (1981) and others have suggested 
that over several centuries the relative looseness and changeableness of 
social and economic life in Europe, compared to China and India, 
helps account for the emergence of modern growth in the West rather 
than in the East. Change implies economic disequilibria which, as 
Schultz (1975) reminds us, imply exploitable opportunities leading to 
augmented effort. (Such disequilibria also cause the production of new 
knowledge, it would seem.)
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Evolved Cultural Patterns
The processes of evolutionary growth extend into technical knowl 
edge, social institutions, language, law, morals, rituals, and practices, 
all of which affect human productive capacities just as does the evolv 
ing stock of land, tools, shelter, and other physical capital one of the 
most interesting aspects of this subject. It is plausible that these aspects 
of human life changed only under the pressure of necessity, as repre 
sented by increased population, and then in turn the new conditions 
influenced the growth of population. If humankind had not developed 
patterns of behavior and association that increased rather than 
decreased the amounts of resources available to us, we would not still 
be here. If, as humankind's numbers increased (or even as numbers 
remained nearly stationary), behavior had led to diminished supplies of 
plants and animals, less flint for tools, and disappearing wood for fires 
and construction, I would not be writing these pages, and you would 
not be reading them. These processes cannot now be documented for 
prehistory, of course, but we have begun to develop knowledge about 
the operation of similar processes in recent decades and the present, 
e.g., changes in institutions for agricultural research (Hayami and Rut- 
tan 1987).
Evolved cultural patterns include voluntary exchange among indi 
viduals, and the markets that function to provide resources in increas 
ing quantities, as discussed above; institutions that pass on knowledge, 
such as schools; libraries, legends and storytellers, all of which store 
knowledge; and monasteries, laboratories, and research-and-develop- 
ment departments which produce knowledge.
Humankind has evolved into creators and problem solvers to an 
extent that people's constructive behavior has outweighed their 
destructive behavior, as evidenced by our increasing life expectancy 
and richness of consumption. And in recent centuries and decades, this 
positive net balance has been increasing rather than decreasing. This 
view of the human as (on balance) a builder conflicts with the view of 
the human as destroyer, which underlies the thought of many doom- 
say ers.
Paradoxically, rules and customs that lead to population growth 
rather than to population stability or decline may be part of our inher 
ited capacity to deal successfully with resource problems in the long
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run, though the added people may exacerbate the problems in the short 
run. Such rules and customs probably lead to long-run success of a 
society in two ways. First, as noted above, high fertility leads to 
increased chances of a group's survival, other things being equal. For 
example, though the Parsis of India have been, as individuals, very 
successful economically, as a people they seem doomed to the failure 
of disappearance in the long run due to their marriage and fertility pat 
terns. Second, high fertility leads to resource problems, which then 
lead to solutions to the problems that usually leave humanity better off 
in the long run than if the problems had never arisen, in the process 
discussed earlier. In a more direct chain of events, rules and customs 
leading to high fertility yield an increased supply of human ingenuity, 
which responds productively to the increased demand for goods.
Particularly slow to change are basic institutions of law and conven 
tion. These institutions tend to evolve gradually rather than being 
altered by political upheaval or legislation. Hayek (1989) argues that 
property rights and the family are the two most important institutions 
in determining the economic progress of a nation. He suggests that 
they, as well as the rest of the rich tapestry of cultural patterns, develop 
by a process of cultural selection wherein communities that grow in 
numbers are more likely to have their institutions be dominant in the 
wider world than are groups that do not increase in population. Much 
of this evolutionary process has taken place over thousands of years. 
But the effects were important for economic development; for exam 
ple, the system of Anglo-Saxon common law and its protection for 
property surely aided the course of the industrial revolution in 
England. Therefore, these slow-moving effects of population increase 
should not be forgotten in our survey of demographic consequences.
Linguistics may be able to cast some light on the rate of change of 
language to population size. In this respect language may be an impor 
tant model for change in other subtle elements in culture.
The effect of population density and size upon the refinement and 
the changes in direction that occur in the law has been hinted at by pre 
liminary studies in the United States relating the size of state to the 
extent to which decisions are cited. This theme needs to be developed.
Most difficult of all to pin down is the effect of population growth 
and the industrial revolution, and their proximate effects discussed ear 
lier, upon individual psychology and small-group sociology. Adam
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Smith remarks that "the progressive state is in reality the cheerful and 
the hearty state to all the different orders of the society. The stationary 
is dull; the declining melancholy." And it was a commonplace during 
the earlier part of the industrial revolution that industrial work disci 
pline, including attention to the daily time schedule for work hours, 
was both important and slow to develop. Many writers have discussed 
the mentality of progress and the notion of systematic scientific 
progress; both ideas were concomitants of the industrial revolution. 
However accurate these observations about psychological and small- 
group effects may be, however, they do not stand on the same level of 
demonstrated fact as do the phenomena discussed in the earlier parts of 
this paper. Yet the brevity of this treatment should not be taken as sug 
gesting that these factors may not be of great significance. (On the 
other hand, perhaps human nature should be seen as having been 
changed relatively little by the industrial revolution. The meaning of 
"little" and "much" are quite subjective, of course.)
Summary and Conclusions
This paper outlines a theory of the role of "human capital" that fits 
the very-long-run trends. It discusses some of the elements that affect 
the speed of adjustment to population change, conditions which are 
different at different times in history and vary from place to place.
1. The state of knowledge clearly is the dominant element that var 
ies in the long run. It is affected by population growth and density, as 
knowledge in turn affects population growth and density.
2. Interrelated with changes in knowledge and production technique 
are changes in the structure of society. These structural changes also 
are influenced by population variables, and vice versa. There is 
increasing recognition of the importance of social and economic struc 
ture in economic development in even the short run. And population 
affects these forces in the long run.
3. The growth of markets, with their many associated phenomena, 
has been a function of population size and density. More people mean 
both more buyers and more sellers, and hence less monopoly and more 
competition and competitive effort.
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4. Slowest-changing are the habits, rituals, language, law, morals, 
and all manner of social institutions, including sexual and childraising 
practices. All of these elements are subject to processes of evolutionary 
change. They not only are affected by population variables, but in turn 
influence population growth and differentially the likelihoods of 
survival of different human groups. Also disease affects in both direc 
tions. Here we have moved all the way to full biology-like evolution 
ary thinking, which is at the other end of the methodological spectrum 
from the sort of physics-like thinking that we apply in very-short-run 
analysis when the relevant elements are known and fixed. But the evo 
lutionary processes in question are social and cultural rather than bio 
logical.
NOTE
1 A more recent estimate is 3.8 billion before 40,000 BCE, 39 billion from 40,000 BCE to the 
start of the Common Era, and 22 6 billion from the year 1 up until the year 1750, plus another 
10 4 billion from then until 1950, and 4 3 billion from then until 1987, for a total of perhaps 80.3 
billion (Bourgeois-Pichat 1989, p 90). The fact that, although Bourgeois-Pichat did not make ref 
erence to Desmond (1975), the two estimates are so close to each other lends confidence to them.
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